The Democratization of Violence: Rethinking National Security in the Age of Open-Source Warfare
The fundamental power of the modern state has long rested on its ability to enforce a monopoly over violence — a power achieved through centuries of social contract, consolidation of military resources, and the organization of large institutions tasked with law enforcement and defense. This monopoly, a cornerstone of modern governance, was famously articulated by sociologist Max Weber in Politics as a Vocation, where he described the state as the sole entity with the legitimate right to use force within a defined territory. In this framework, the state claims authority through control over armed forces, policing, and the rule of law, ensuring its stability and that of society.
However, the stability of this monopoly is facing unprecedented challenges. We are now in an era where individuals and small groups can access powerful tools for violence and disruption, often with a few clicks or a modest investment. What once required entire institutions — sophisticated machinery, specialized training, and state-sanctioned resources — can now be achieved by non-state actors from the relative anonymity of their homes. The democratization of violence, facilitated by open-source technologies, poses a fundamental challenge to the assumptions underpinning state security. The upcoming book ‘Democratizing Violence: The Rise of Open-Source Warfare and the Decline of State Control’ delves into the implications of this phenomenon, examining how state security frameworks, originally designed to protect centralized power structures, are grappling with the destabilizing reality of a world where the tools of warfare are increasingly accessible to all.
Historically, technological innovations have repeatedly upended power dynamics, often in unforeseen ways. Alfred Nobel’s invention of dynamite was initially intended to aid in mining and infrastructure projects, transforming construction by making it possible to tunnel through solid rock with unprecedented efficiency. But Nobel’s invention quickly became a weapon, used not only in state military operations but also by revolutionary groups, creating a new paradigm in insurgency and political violence. Similarly, Mikhail Kalashnikov’s AK-47, intended as a reliable firearm for the Soviet army, became the emblem of 20th-century insurgencies around the globe, lauded for its durability, simplicity, and effectiveness in the harshest environments. Both inventions, conceived within the confines of state oversight or industrial application, ultimately became accessible tools for non-state actors, reshaping the methods of conflict and setting the stage for the modern democratization of violence.
In the 21st century, this trajectory has accelerated dramatically. We are witnessing an era where the internet, globalization, and technological advancements have removed the physical and financial barriers to weaponry, enabling ordinary individuals to manufacture and deploy weapons once monopolized by the state. The spread of 3D-printing technology, for example, has made it possible to design and fabricate firearms with minimal technical expertise and no reliance on conventional supply chains. Drones, once restricted to advanced military operations, are now available in consumer forms that can be modified for surveillance, reconnaissance, and even direct attacks. The proliferation of cyber tools further compounds this issue, allowing hackers, “hacktivists,” and criminal enterprises to penetrate critical infrastructure and disrupt national security from any location with an internet connection. Each of these advancements represents a breakdown in the state’s control over violence, fragmenting power into decentralized, unpredictable nodes that operate outside traditional oversight.
The implications of this shift are profound and wide-ranging. Traditional security models are based on the premise that states are the primary actors with access to organized violence, while individuals and small groups are largely unarmed or restrained by regulatory systems. But in a world where any actor can access encrypted communications to coordinate, drones for aerial surveillance or assault, 3D-printed firearms for untraceable armament, and cyber tools capable of economic sabotage, this model of security is no longer viable. State agencies that once focused their efforts on known enemies, identifiable through traditional intelligence and military channels, now face a dizzying array of smaller, dispersed, and often anonymous actors who can operate across borders with relative ease.
The democratization of violence extends beyond physical tools. Encrypted communication has empowered non-state actors to organize in secret, evading surveillance and coordinating activities without fear of interception. Cyber tools and hacking capabilities allow attacks on state infrastructure, from power grids to government databases, creating vulnerabilities that traditional military defense mechanisms cannot counteract. The internet, as a knowledge-sharing platform, has amplified these threats by allowing blueprints, manuals, and tactical guides to proliferate freely, enabling even the least experienced actors to acquire the skills needed for militaristic disruption.
This decentralization challenges not only the state’s capacity for control but also its legitimacy. A state’s claim to authority is intrinsically tied to its ability to enforce laws and maintain order within its borders. When individuals and groups within a society possess the means to circumvent or directly challenge this authority, the state’s foundational power erodes. How does a government enforce laws when citizens can arm themselves independently? How does it secure infrastructure when any actor, domestic or foreign, can threaten critical services from across the globe? These questions lie at the heart of ‘Democratizing Violence: The Rise of Open-Source Warfare and the Decline of State Control’ inviting readers to reconsider the relationship between technology, security, and governance in an age where violence and power are no longer centralized.
The path forward is not yet clear, but one fact remains: as power continues to disperse, the role of the state, and our understanding of security, must evolve. We are at the cusp of a new epoch in warfare — one defined not by the might of nations but by the capabilities of individuals. Only by confronting this reality can we begin to build a resilient future in which the mechanisms of violence, no longer confined to the state, are managed, mitigated, and understood.
What is War?
War has been defined by centuries of strategists and theorists, each contributing their own understanding of its nature, purpose, and mechanics. From the early works of ancient scholars to the refined doctrines of modern military thinkers, the definition of war has evolved to encompass a wide range of methods, intentions, and implications. By examining definitions from figures like Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Vegetius, Frederick the Great, and Paul Linebarger, we gain insight into the enduring principles that have guided state-controlled violence and set the foundation against which open-source warfare will be contrasted.
Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general and military theorist, famously described war as “the continuation of politics by other means” in his seminal work On War. For Clausewitz, war is a means to achieve political objectives through organized violence. He saw it as an act of force to compel an opponent to submit to one’s will, governed by the “trinity” of passion, chance, and reason. Clausewitz’s model emphasized that war is inherently state-driven, conducted by organized militaries and directed toward a defined political end. In this sense, he underscored the centralized control and structure of war as a regulated extension of state authority.
In contrast, Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist, framed war as a skillful art that hinges on deception, flexibility, and psychological manipulation. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu emphasizes that victory comes not merely from brute force but from understanding, adapting, and exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary. His approach to warfare incorporates both direct and indirect tactics, allowing smaller, potentially less-organized groups to succeed by maximizing strategic advantage. While Sun Tzu’s philosophy underscores the importance of adaptability, it remains rooted in the context of conventional state warfare, with a structured chain of command and clearly defined objectives.
The Roman author Vegetius, in his work De Re Militari, highlighted the preparation and discipline necessary for successful warfare, emphasizing the value of organization, logistical planning, and the efficient training of soldiers. His work, largely focused on the Roman Empire’s military strategy, reflects the essence of structured, state-controlled violence. Vegetius’s maxim, “If you want peace, prepare for war,” suggests a well-coordinated approach to war as a tool for state stability and security, further illustrating how traditional warfare has been primarily understood as a function of organized, hierarchical forces.
Frederick the Great, the Prussian monarch and military leader, approached war as a disciplined exercise in statecraft. His writings focus on strategic efficiency and control, underscoring the state’s role in leveraging war as an extension of political ambition. Frederick’s approach was rooted in structured campaigns, methodical planning, and a reliance on centralized decision-making — a model that exemplified the state’s exclusive right to engage in organized violence for territorial or political gain.
In his seminal work Psychological Warfare, Paul Linebarger, also known as “the father of psychological warfare” defined war as the “reciprocal application of violence by public, armed bodies.” Linebarger asserted that the “killing of persons who do not defend themselves is not war, but slaughter, massacre, or punishment” and that violence exerted outside of the control of the state would not also be considered war as “the governments of the modern world are jealous of their own monopoly of violence.”
This interpretation of war by Paul Linebarger introduces key distinctions between state-controlled violence and the informal, decentralized approaches to conflict that characterize open-source warfare. Linebarger’s definition emphasizes several criteria that traditional warfare must meet: it must be a reciprocal application of violence between public, organized bodies; it must operate under state sanction and rules; and, crucially, it must be aimed at compelling the enemy to change behavior or ideology. His perspective illustrates how states carefully structure war to fit a complex institutional and legal framework, one designed to uphold their exclusive authority over violence.
For Linebarger, war is not simply large-scale violence but rather a highly structured and legalized application of force, conducted within specific social and political contexts. It serves as the ultimate tool for states to exert influence over others, reflecting a nuanced blend of psychological pressure, institutional complexity, and precise execution. The state’s monopoly on violence, therefore, is evident in how it regulates war: participants must have official sanction, follow prescribed tactics, and operate within the parameters of law, even in times of conflict. Any action that falls outside these standards — unregulated killings, non-reciprocal attacks, or actions by groups lacking public legitimacy — is considered not war, but something else entirely: a massacre, rebellion, or slaughter.
This formalization of war underscores the role of the state in establishing not only the legitimacy of conflict but also the ethical, legal, and operational standards that differentiate warfare from mere violence. Linebarger explains that the state must control who may fight, where and how they may engage, and to what end, ensuring that all violence serves a strategic purpose within the larger societal framework. Modern warfare, then, is far from an uncontrolled orgy of violence; it is a ceremonial, intricate exercise where each action is calculated to achieve specific outcomes.
According to Linebarger, the purpose of war is ultimately to compel the enemy to change, whether by surrender, compliance, or ideological shift. Unlike casual violence, war’s primary function is to influence minds, to persuade adversaries to submit to the victor’s values, demands, or way of life. In this sense, modern war is as much about psychological influence as it is about physical destruction. As he puts it, even World War II was, in its own way, “a peculiar kind of advertising campaign,” one designed to render the ideologies of the German and Japanese states unacceptable to their own people and make compliance with Allied terms the preferable outcome.
Linebarger’s definition of war, therefore, epitomizes the structured, rule-bound violence that states have monopolized and controlled throughout history. His emphasis on the formal, public, and reciprocal nature of war aligns with the state’s need to legitimize its exclusive authority over force, maintaining social order even in times of conflict. This structured approach is precisely what open-source warfare disrupts, as it introduces a model of conflict that is often informal, decentralized, and conducted without the sanction or control of state authorities.
In the context of open-source warfare, this distinction between formal, state-sanctioned war and informal, autonomous violence is critical. While traditional war requires “public” bodies and reciprocal violence, open-source warfare removes these requirements, allowing non-state actors to engage in conflicts without the constraints that have historically governed state-controlled violence. Open-source warfare thrives outside these frameworks, embodying a new kind of conflict where individuals and small groups can wield significant influence without the need for formal identification, political legitimacy, or state support.
The advent of open-source warfare fundamentally challenges Linebarger’s assertion that modern war is an extension of institutional and societal complexity. In open-source warfare, there is no General Staff to dictate strategy, no formal “declaration” of hostilities, and no adherence to the legal and ethical norms established by states. Instead, this new form of conflict exists in a gray area, conducted by actors who operate independently, often anonymously, and outside the traditional rules of engagement. Open-source warfare embodies the collapse of centralized, rule-bound conflict, introducing a model that bypasses the monopoly on violence states have historically maintained and redefining the nature of conflict in an age of decentralized power.
What is Open-Source Warfare?
The concept of “open-source warfare” emerged as a modern adaptation of war in an age of digital technology, decentralized knowledge, and democratized access to tools of violence. Coined by John Robb in his book Brave New War, the term describes a method of warfare in which autonomous groups operate independently while leveraging shared knowledge, tactics, and resources — often without formal coordination or a centralized chain of command. In this sense, open-source warfare diverges sharply from the classical definitions of war, emphasizing decentralized power and the collective contribution of small actors over centralized state control.
Robb’s concept reflects the dynamic, often chaotic nature of modern insurgencies and conflicts, where small groups and individual actors collaborate informally, much like open-source software developers. Open-source warfare blurs the lines between combatants and non-combatants, peace and war, by enabling individuals and non-state actors to engage in militaristic actions independently of state oversight. Unlike traditional warfare, where states dictate the terms, open-source warfare is driven by the contributions of myriad, independent groups who share information, tactics, and innovations through the internet and other informal channels. In this model, small autonomous groups can target state actors, critical infrastructure, and civilian populations with tactics learned online and weapons made from accessible, commercial technologies.
This decentralization has created a landscape where warfare can be conducted outside the purview of traditional military hierarchies, with tactics evolving in real-time as groups adapt to new methods and technologies. As noted in a study titled “Common Ecology Quantifies Human Insurgency,” published in Nature magazine, open-source insurgencies follow patterns that resemble ecologies — self-organizing, dynamically evolving entities that operate according to shared rules of engagement. This ecology model demonstrates that the size, distribution, and timing of violent events across diverse insurgent conflicts exhibit remarkable similarities, suggesting that non-state warfare has become a self-sustaining ecosystem, driven by universal principles rather than centralized authority.
By allowing for this fluid, self-organizing structure, open-source warfare challenges the conventional notion of state sovereignty. Traditional war, defined by state-sponsored campaigns and clear command structures, contrasts with open-source conflicts where participants may have no formal affiliation with each other yet pursue common objectives through collective actions. Open-source warfare is, in essence, an anti-structure model that leverages technology, information sharing, and the power of decentralized collaboration to achieve impact with minimal resources.