Strange Bedfellows: How U.S. Policy in Syria Turned a Jihadist into a Stabilizing Force

I. Introduction

The bizarre reality of a former Al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked leader being portrayed as a preferable option to the Assad regime encapsulates the bewildering consequences of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This seemingly improbable scenario illustrates how decades of intervention, short-term strategic calculations, and reliance on proxy forces have produced a kaleidoscope of unintended outcomes, leaving policymakers grappling with choices that defy traditional definitions of good and evil. In Syria, the resurgence of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—once a leading figure in Al-Qaeda and now the head of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—as a regional strongman in Idlib underscores this confounding reality.

Jolani’s transformation is as strategic as it is startling. After years of fighting under the banner of Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, Jolani severed ties with Al-Qaeda in 2016 and rebranded his group as HTS. This rebranding aimed to present HTS as a Syrian nationalist group rather than a transnational jihadist force. In Idlib, the last major rebel-held stronghold, Jolani and HTS have positioned themselves as the de facto governing authority. Through a combination of military force and political pragmatism, Jolani has sought to gain legitimacy, even engaging with Western journalists and hinting at his willingness to cooperate with the U.S. to keep ISIS at bay and resist Assad’s regime.

These developments are a product of a conflict that spiraled far beyond its initial roots. When the Syrian uprising began in 2011, calls for democratic reforms were met with brutal repression by Assad. In response, the U.S. and its allies sought to empower rebel groups that appeared to offer a moderate, secular alternative to Assad. However, the landscape of the Syrian opposition quickly splintered. Moderate factions were often outmatched or absorbed by better-equipped, ideologically hardened extremist groups. The chaotic nature of the conflict created a fertile ground for jihadist factions, and U.S. weapons intended for moderate rebels frequently ended up in the hands of groups like Jabhat al-Nusra.

This paradoxical scenario reflects the recurring themes of Weapons of Misfortune. U.S. interventions, driven by the pursuit of immediate geopolitical goals, have repeatedly created power vacuums filled by extremists. In Syria, the policy of supporting opposition forces to weaken Assad inadvertently facilitated the rise of jihadist groups that now pose their own threats. The outcome is a landscape where Western policymakers are faced with unpalatable choices: accept a brutal authoritarian regime or consider cooperating with a rebranded jihadist who once sought their destruction. The very groups once vilified as enemies become part of a grotesque calculus for regional stability.

The story of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and HTS is a microcosm of the broader failures of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East—a policy characterized by an overreliance on military interventions, insufficient understanding of local dynamics, and a failure to anticipate the long-term consequences of short-term decisions. These interventions have created a cycle where today's proxies become tomorrow’s adversaries, and the lines between friend and foe blur until they are nearly indistinguishable. In navigating the wreckage of these policies, the United States finds itself continually forced to choose between the lesser of two evils, a choice that perpetuates instability rather than resolving it.

II. Historical Context of U.S. Interventions in Syria

The Syrian conflict began in 2011 with a surge of optimism that soon descended into one of the most brutal and complex civil wars of the modern era. Sparked by the Arab Spring—a wave of pro-democracy uprisings that spread across the Middle East—the initial protests in Syria were driven by demands for democratic reforms, justice, and an end to corruption and authoritarian rule. In the southern city of Daraa, the regime's heavy-handed response to a group of teenagers who had spray-painted anti-government slogans ignited mass demonstrations. The government of Bashar al-Assad met these protests with violent suppression, using security forces to arrest, torture, and kill protesters. What started as peaceful calls for reform quickly escalated into an armed insurgency as various factions took up arms in response to state brutality.

The rapid deterioration of Syria into chaos posed a dilemma for the United States. Initially hesitant to get directly involved, the Obama administration sought a middle ground—supporting the opposition enough to pressure Assad without committing to a full-scale intervention. The U.S. saw Assad’s regime as a brutal dictatorship and hoped his removal would pave the way for a more democratic and Western-friendly government. Yet, the U.S. also feared the potential vacuum left behind. Memories of the 2003 Iraq invasion and the rise of insurgent groups that followed loomed large, serving as a cautionary tale of what could happen if a regime was toppled without a clear plan for stabilization.

The decision to support Syrian rebel groups came with significant challenges. The opposition was never a monolithic entity; it was a fragmented mosaic of secularists, nationalists, tribal militias, and hardline Islamists. Initially, the U.S. backed groups that were perceived as “moderate,” hoping they would serve as a bulwark against both Assad and extremist factions. These moderate groups, however, faced a host of difficulties: lack of coordination, inadequate resources, and internal divisions left them vulnerable to better-funded and more disciplined jihadist factions.

Among these jihadist groups, Jabhat al-Nusra, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, quickly rose to prominence. Al-Nusra presented itself as a capable and determined fighting force, winning popular support by delivering essential services and demonstrating military effectiveness. Unlike some other factions, al-Nusra benefited from extensive experience, ideological cohesion, and funding from private donors in the Gulf states. As the conflict dragged on, weapons and supplies provided by the U.S. and its allies frequently ended up in the hands of al-Nusra, either through battlefield capture, alliances of convenience, or defection.

This outcome revealed the inherent risks of proxy warfare. The U.S. policy of supporting anti-Assad forces relied on a fragile and sometimes naive hope that moderate groups could prevail over extremists in the fog of war. In reality, the chaotic nature of the Syrian conflict made it impossible to control where American support ultimately landed. The very act of arming rebels accelerated the fragmentation of the opposition, making it easier for extremist groups to gain a foothold. The distinction between moderate and extremist blurred as alliances shifted and the battlefield evolved.

The overarching goal of removing Assad clashed with the sobering realization that his downfall could unleash even greater instability. The Assad regime, backed by Russia, Iran, and the powerful Hezbollah militia, proved far more resilient than many in Washington had anticipated. As the war wore on, the U.S. found itself trapped in a strategic quandary: removing Assad might open the door for jihadist factions like al-Nusra and later ISIS to fill the void, while leaving Assad in power meant tolerating a regime responsible for egregious human rights abuses.

The rise of ISIS further complicated U.S. strategy. In 2014, ISIS declared a caliphate spanning large portions of Syria and Iraq, prompting the U.S. to shift its focus from ousting Assad to defeating ISIS. This pivot led to an uneasy prioritization: Assad was still viewed as a problem, but ISIS was seen as the more immediate threat. The U.S.-led coalition against ISIS coordinated with various Kurdish and Arab militias under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a partnership that strained relations with Turkey, a NATO ally. Meanwhile, the conflict's other jihadist groups, including al-Nusra (which later rebranded as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS), sought to consolidate their power in Idlib and distinguish themselves from ISIS by adopting more pragmatic approaches.

In the end, the Syrian conflict encapsulates the bewildering contradictions of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The desire to remove a dictator led to support for rebels who, in some cases, were indistinguishable from the extremists the U.S. was trying to contain. The intervention created a tangle of competing interests and unintended consequences, where former enemies became potential allies, and the lines between good and evil, stability and chaos, dissolved. This strategic ambiguity laid the groundwork for paradoxical outcomes, like the recent normalization of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—a former Al-Qaeda leader—who now positions himself as a lesser evil compared to Assad.

Syria’s descent into chaos serves as a grim reminder of how U.S. interventions, driven by immediate goals, often overlook the complexities of regional dynamics, setting the stage for long-term instability that defies easy solutions.

III. Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s Transformation

Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s transformation from an Al-Qaeda operative to the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is emblematic of the contradictions and complexities inherent in the Syrian conflict and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. His journey highlights the malleable nature of labels like "terrorist" and "freedom fighter," depending on the geopolitical context and the shifting priorities of foreign powers. Al-Jolani's evolution has been less a personal reinvention and more a calculated adaptation to the political realities on the ground—a move that has blurred the line between jihadist extremism and localized pragmatism.

From Al-Qaeda Operative to Leader of HTS

Born Ahmed Hussein al-Shar’a in 1981 in the eastern Syrian city of Deir Ezzor, al-Jolani's path to prominence began with his early association with jihadist movements in Iraq. During the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, al-Jolani joined the insurgency led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which later evolved into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and, ultimately, ISIS. Al-Jolani was captured by U.S. forces in 2006 and held at Camp Bucca, a detention center that inadvertently served as a breeding ground for extremist networking and training. Upon his release in 2008, he returned to the insurgency, refining his leadership skills and solidifying his ideological convictions.

In 2011, when the Syrian uprising began, al-Jolani saw an opportunity to expand Al-Qaeda's influence. He led a group of fighters into Syria and founded Jabhat al-Nusra, an official Al-Qaeda affiliate committed to toppling Bashar al-Assad's regime. Al-Nusra quickly became one of the most effective and disciplined rebel groups, drawing recruits and resources from across the region. Unlike ISIS, which sought to impose a transnational caliphate through brutal and uncompromising tactics, al-Jolani focused on building alliances with local Syrian factions and embedding his organization within the broader anti-Assad movement.

However, in 2016, al-Jolani announced that Jabhat al-Nusra would sever its formal ties with Al-Qaeda and rebrand itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). This move was widely seen as a strategic attempt to shed the stigma of being an Al-Qaeda affiliate and gain broader support from local populations and foreign backers. A year later, JFS merged with other Islamist factions to form Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Although HTS maintained a hardline Islamist ideology, al-Jolani presented it as a distinctly Syrian movement focused on local governance rather than global jihad.

Rebranding as a Local Governing Force

Al-Jolani’s efforts to rebrand HTS went beyond mere rhetoric. Recognizing that his group’s survival depended on local legitimacy and international tolerance, he began implementing policies designed to portray HTS as a pragmatic governing authority. In Idlib, the last major rebel-held stronghold in Syria, HTS established a rudimentary civil administration known as the Salvation Government. This body oversaw essential services like education, healthcare, and infrastructure repair, presenting HTS as a stabilizing force capable of filling the governance vacuum left by the collapse of state institutions.

HTS also sought to distance itself from the more extreme practices of ISIS. While still adhering to an austere interpretation of Islamic law, al-Jolani’s group moderated its public behavior, reducing the visibility of harsh punishments and focusing instead on maintaining security and order. HTS clamped down on rival jihadist factions, particularly those aligned with Al-Qaeda and ISIS, asserting its dominance over the region and attempting to prevent Idlib from descending into chaos. This strategy aimed to position HTS as a necessary bulwark against both Assad's forces and the unchecked extremism of other jihadist groups.

Shifting Media Narratives

Western and regional media narratives have increasingly reflected this complex reality. In a bewildering twist, some portrayals of al-Jolani frame him as a lesser evil—a pragmatic leader who, while still an Islamist militant, offers a degree of stability and governance preferable to the brutal repression of the Assad regime. This shift is not merely a result of HTS's rebranding efforts but also a reflection of the dire choices left by the war. After years of conflict, the alternatives in Syria’s Idlib province have been reduced to Assad’s authoritarian rule, the chaos of ungoverned spaces, or the relative order imposed by HTS.

In a 2021 interview with PBS Frontline, al-Jolani appeared in Western-style clothing, eschewing the traditional jihadist garb of robes and turbans. He spoke of his desire for a “free Syria” and denied any intention to harm Western nations, emphasizing that his fight was solely against Assad’s regime. This carefully curated image was designed to appeal to Western audiences and policymakers, hinting at the possibility of a tacit understanding between HTS and foreign powers.

However, this portrayal remains controversial and fraught with contradictions. While some analysts view al-Jolani as a pragmatic leader capable of maintaining order, others argue that his past cannot be so easily erased. The U.S. State Department continues to classify HTS as a terrorist organization, and the group’s rebranding is seen by many as a cynical ploy to gain legitimacy while maintaining its core jihadist ideology.

The rise of al-Jolani as a perceived stabilizing force underscores the central themes of Weapons of Misfortune. U.S. interventions and proxy wars have consistently produced unintended consequences, creating power vacuums that are filled by actors who defy easy categorization. In Syria, the push to remove Assad led to a fragmented opposition where extremists like al-Jolani thrived. Now, after more than a decade of conflict, the choices are bleak: Assad’s ruthless regime or a former Al-Qaeda leader who claims to offer local stability.

This paradox reflects the bewildering nature of U.S. foreign policy in the region. In pursuing short-term goals—whether supporting rebels in Syria, arming mujahideen in Afghanistan, or toppling dictators like Saddam Hussein—the U.S. has repeatedly found itself facing unintended and often disastrous long-term outcomes. The emergence of figures like al-Jolani as seemingly preferable options is a testament to how these interventions have reshaped the Middle East in unpredictable and unsettling ways.

IV. The Consequences of U.S. Policies

The consequences of U.S. policies in Syria reflect a troubling continuity with the past—a pattern where well-intentioned, short-term strategies unravel into long-term crises. By providing support to various factions within the Syrian opposition, the United States once again found itself inadvertently empowering extremist groups and deepening the cycle of conflict. These policies mirror the missteps seen in places like Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq, where yesterday’s allies transformed into today’s adversaries, and the pursuit of regime change or strategic dominance led to the creation of power vacuums filled by chaos, violence, and extremism.

Arming Rebels and Empowering Extremists

In the early stages of the Syrian uprising, the U.S. decision to provide support to rebel groups was framed as a humanitarian and strategic imperative. The Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters in 2011 escalated into a full-scale civil war. Faced with the horrors of chemical weapons attacks, mass executions, and the displacement of millions, the U.S. and its allies saw arming the opposition as a means to hasten Assad's downfall and bring about a more democratic, Western-aligned Syria. This approach was grounded in the belief that empowering local forces would achieve regime change without necessitating direct U.S. military intervention.

However, the fragmented nature of the Syrian opposition posed immediate challenges. The opposition was not a monolithic entity but a patchwork of secular nationalists, moderate Islamists, and hardline jihadists. Vetting these groups proved difficult, and weapons and funding intended for moderate factions often ended up in the hands of extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria) and later, ISIS. These groups, with superior organization, battlefield effectiveness, and ideological clarity, quickly eclipsed the moderates, attracting recruits and resources.

The parallels with Afghanistan in the 1980s are stark. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the U.S. funneled weapons and resources to the mujahideen through Operation Cyclone. This strategy successfully expelled Soviet forces but laid the groundwork for the rise of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Similarly, in Syria, U.S.-supplied weapons found their way into the arsenals of jihadist groups, which later turned those weapons against Western interests and their regional allies.

In Libya, the U.S.-backed intervention to topple Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 created another power vacuum. Rebel factions, initially hailed as liberators, splintered into militias and extremist groups. The weapons stockpiles left unguarded after Gaddafi's fall spread across North Africa, fueling conflicts in Mali, Niger, and beyond. The echoes of this experience in Syria are clear: well-armed, loosely organized rebels, once viewed as instruments of liberation, morphed into sources of instability and extremism.

Power Vacuums and Proxy Warfare

The failure to anticipate the consequences of Assad's potential ouster is emblematic of a broader flaw in U.S. foreign policy—the inability to plan for the "day after" regime change. The assumption that removing Assad would lead to a more stable, democratic Syria ignored the realities of Syria’s sectarian divides, regional rivalries, and the competing interests of foreign powers.

As the Assad regime weakened, a power vacuum emerged, and Syria became a battlefield for proxy warfare. Various factions, supported by different regional and global powers, vied for control. The U.S. backed Kurdish forces through the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while Turkey supported Islamist factions opposed to both Assad and Kurdish autonomy. Iran and Russia stepped in to prop up Assad, viewing his regime as a strategic bulwark against Western and Sunni Arab influence. The result was a fragmented Syria controlled by competing factions, each serving the interests of their foreign patrons.

This proxy dynamic bears resemblance to the Iraq War and its aftermath. The removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, driven by U.S. policy, dismantled Iraq's power structures and created a vacuum that was filled by sectarian violence, Iranian influence, and the rise of ISIS. In both Syria and Iraq, the absence of a coherent plan for post-regime stability allowed extremist groups to thrive and regional powers to expand their influence.

The Syrian conflict also illustrates how proxy warfare can entrench and perpetuate conflicts. The involvement of Russia and Iran on behalf of Assad, countered by U.S. and Turkish support for various opposition groups, created a quagmire where diplomatic solutions became increasingly elusive. Each side’s investment in their proxies made compromise difficult, ensuring that the war dragged on and deepened humanitarian suffering.

Unintended Consequences and Impossible Choices

The rise of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib is a direct consequence of these policies. In the vacuum left by Assad’s weakened control and the failure of moderate rebels to coalesce, al-Jolani’s group emerged as the dominant force. The fact that al-Jolani—a former Al-Qaeda leader—can now be viewed as a "lesser evil" compared to Assad underscores the impossible choices created by years of intervention and miscalculation.

This bewildering scenario reflects the themes explored in Weapons of Misfortune: U.S. interventions often begin with clear, if ambitious, goals but lead to outcomes that are morally and strategically confounding. The cycle of arming proxy forces, toppling regimes, and failing to establish stable governance has repeatedly forced the U.S. and its allies into choosing between different shades of extremism or authoritarianism.

Ultimately, the Syrian conflict serves as a stark reminder that short-term tactical decisions—no matter how well-intentioned—must be weighed against long-term strategic consequences. The power vacuums, proxy wars, and extremist resurgences that follow U.S. interventions are not aberrations but recurring patterns that demand a fundamental reassessment of American foreign policy. Without this reassessment, the bewildering outcomes seen in Syria will continue to haunt future engagements across the globe.

V. The Moral Ambiguity of Proxy Wars

The moral ambiguity of proxy wars lies at the heart of U.S. foreign policy decisions, where choosing between the "lesser evil" can lead to ethical and strategic dilemmas with far-reaching consequences. In the context of Syria, the decision to support factions like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), despite its roots in Al-Qaeda, reflects a desperate calculus to counterbalance the oppressive Assad regime. This situation forces a troubling reality: when one adversary becomes too entrenched or dangerous, aligning with another, albeit problematic, force may appear necessary. The ethics of such decisions are fraught, but they are often presented as the only viable option in a landscape of limited and undesirable choices.

Difficult Choices: Partnering with Lesser Evils

The decision to tacitly tolerate groups like HTS stems from a broader U.S. strategic dilemma in Syria. With Assad's regime committing widespread atrocities and backed by adversaries like Russia and Iran, the prospect of eliminating all opposition forces, regardless of their affiliations, seemed counterproductive. Groups like HTS, though ideologically extremist, presented an organized and effective force against Assad’s military and jihadist groups like ISIS. This strategy echoes previous U.S. decisions in conflicts where moral compromise was deemed necessary to achieve a larger strategic goal.

A historical parallel is found in the Soviet-Afghan War, where the U.S. supported the mujahideen to counter Soviet expansion. Among these mujahideen were factions that later formed Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. At the time, these groups were seen as valuable assets in the Cold War struggle. However, once the Soviets withdrew, these same factions turned their focus toward Western targets, culminating in the 9/11 attacks. The temporary alignment with extremist forces produced long-term consequences that reverberated far beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

In Syria, partnering with HTS or other extremist factions against Assad poses similar ethical challenges. HTS’s attempts to rebrand itself as a local governing force do not erase its origins or its past actions. The group remains on the U.S. State Department’s list of designated terrorist organizations due to its ties to Al-Qaeda and its role in orchestrating attacks. Supporting or tolerating such a group risks legitimizing its authority and creating future security threats, even if it offers a temporary strategic advantage.

Blowback and Long-Term Instability

The concept of blowback—the unintended negative consequences of covert operations or interventions—has been a recurring theme in U.S. foreign policy. The Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan is a prime example. The U.S. initially supported the mujahideen to counter the Soviets, but once the immediate threat was gone, the power vacuum left behind allowed the Taliban to seize control. Decades later, after a costly and protracted conflict, the Taliban’s return to power following the U.S. withdrawal in 2021 showcased the enduring impact of those early decisions.

In Iraq, the U.S.-led invasion and the dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s regime created a chaotic environment ripe for insurgent groups. The disbandment of the Iraqi army and the marginalization of Sunni communities fueled resentment and provided fertile ground for the rise of ISIS. What began as a mission to eliminate a dictator ended with a far more virulent and globalized extremist threat.

Syria mirrors these patterns. The power vacuums created by the degradation of Assad’s authority and the fragmentation of the opposition have allowed extremist groups like HTS to establish control over regions like Idlib. Even if these groups are temporarily seen as a counterbalance to Assad or ISIS, their governance is unlikely to produce long-term stability. Instead, they perpetuate cycles of conflict, repression, and radicalization.

Ethical Dilemmas in Proxy Warfare

The ethical dilemmas inherent in proxy warfare are not easily resolved. When the U.S. chooses to arm or support certain factions, it often does so with incomplete information, under immense strategic pressure, and with limited viable options. This creates situations where the immediate tactical objective—whether it is undermining Assad, countering ISIS, or limiting Russian and Iranian influence—overshadows the long-term ethical and strategic implications.

These difficult choices often lead to moral compromises that undermine the very values the U.S. purports to uphold. Supporting factions with extremist ideologies, even indirectly, contradicts broader commitments to human rights and counterterrorism. Furthermore, these decisions can erode global perceptions of U.S. credibility and moral leadership.

The Syrian conflict encapsulates the core themes of Weapons of Misfortune: how short-term strategic decisions, driven by immediate geopolitical interests, frequently lead to long-term instability and blowback. By engaging in proxy wars and choosing the "lesser evil," the U.S. risks perpetuating cycles of violence that are difficult to break. The rise of figures like Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and the uneasy toleration of groups like HTS are stark reminders of the moral ambiguity that haunts U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The outcomes are rarely clean, the choices rarely simple, and the consequences rarely confined to a single generation or region.

VI. The Broader Themes of Weapons of Misfortune

The recent developments in Syria, where Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—once an Al-Qaeda and ISIS figure—is now framed as a stabilizing alternative to Assad, vividly illustrate the core themes explored in Weapons of Misfortune. The situation is not unique but part of a recurring pattern of U.S. interventions, where short-term tactical decisions breed long-term strategic failures and create morally and politically ambiguous outcomes.

The historical parallels are striking. In Iran’s 1953 coup, the U.S. ousted the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh to protect oil interests and counter Soviet influence. The immediate goal was achieved by reinstating the Shah’s pro-Western regime. However, the suppression of Iranian democracy fueled decades of resentment, ultimately culminating in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which led to an anti-Western theocracy that continues to challenge U.S. interests to this day. The unintended consequence was a regime far more hostile and resistant to U.S. influence than what was overthrown.

In Afghanistan, U.S. support for the Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War was driven by Cold War logic, aimed at weakening the Soviet Union. However, the empowerment of radical Islamist factions, including figures like Osama bin Laden, backfired spectacularly. The Mujahideen’s victory and subsequent fragmentation led to the rise of the Taliban, who harbored Al-Qaeda and facilitated the 9/11 attacks. The blowback from these decisions cost the U.S. two decades of war, thousands of lives, and trillions of dollars, only for the Taliban to retake power in 2021.

Iraq’s destabilization is another poignant example. The 2003 invasion, justified by flawed intelligence and a desire to remove Saddam Hussein, dismantled the Iraqi state apparatus and created a power vacuum that incubated the rise of ISIS. The disbandment of the Iraqi army and the alienation of Sunni communities generated fertile ground for insurgency and sectarian conflict. The fall of Hussein solved one problem but unleashed a far greater and more enduring threat.

In each of these cases, a clear pattern emerges: short-term tactical victories driven by geopolitical ambitions create long-term instability. U.S. policymakers consistently underestimate the complexity of the regions they intervene in, disregard the nuanced social and political dynamics, and fail to plan for the aftermath. The pursuit of immediate strategic gains often blinds decision-makers to the seeds of future conflict they are sowing.

Recurring Flaws in Strategy

The recurring flaws in U.S. interventionist policy are painfully evident. These include the tendency to oversimplify conflicts, misjudge local actors, and over-rely on military solutions. In Syria, the fragmented support for rebel factions, some of whom were aligned with extremist ideologies, mirrored the mistakes of the past. The belief that Assad’s removal could lead to a quick and favorable outcome ignored the reality of a deeply divided opposition and the influence of regional powers like Russia and Iran.

Another flaw is the failure to anticipate and manage power vacuums. Just as the collapse of regimes in Iraq and Libya led to chaos and extremism, the weakening of Assad’s control over Syria allowed groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and later HTS to thrive. The unintended consequence was a fragmented state where extremist factions filled the void left by a crumbling regime. The U.S.’s inability to predict or contain these outcomes highlights a fundamental weakness in its strategic planning.

Furthermore, the ethical compromises inherent in proxy warfare undermine U.S. credibility and long-term objectives. Supporting extremist groups, even temporarily, damages the U.S.’s standing as a champion of democracy and human rights. It creates a narrative of hypocrisy that adversaries exploit to rally anti-American sentiment. The strategic calculus that leads to these alliances may offer short-term gains, but it often comes at the cost of lasting instability and blowback.

VII. Conclusion

The paradox of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s transformation into a seemingly preferable alternative to Assad encapsulates the bewildering consequences of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This scenario—a former Al-Qaeda operative now seen as a stabilizing force—reflects the same themes that resonate throughout Weapons of Misfortune. It underscores the dangers of interventions that prioritize immediate victories over sustainable solutions, the folly of empowering proxy forces who later become adversaries, and the moral ambiguity of choosing between shades of extremism.

Syria’s ongoing conflict is a microcosm of broader U.S. interventionist policy failures. The patterns of destabilization, unintended consequences, and blowback are not anomalies but symptoms of a flawed strategic approach. The outcomes in Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and now Syria all follow a dishearteningly similar trajectory: the pursuit of short-term geopolitical goals leads to long-term regional chaos.

To break this cycle, the U.S. must embrace a more nuanced, historically informed, and diplomatically centered approach to foreign policy. This means recognizing the limits of military power, understanding the intricacies of local dynamics, and committing to strategies that prioritize long-term stability over immediate tactical gains. Diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and genuine engagement with local stakeholders must take precedence over quick-fix interventions.

The lessons of the past are clear, but whether they are heeded remains to be seen. The future of U.S. foreign policy—and the stability of regions like the Middle East—depends on a willingness to learn from these hard-fought experiences and to forge a path that avoids perpetuating cycles of conflict. Weapons of Misfortune serves as both a warning and a guide, urging policymakers and the public to reconsider the costs of intervention and to strive for a more thoughtful, responsible, and effective approach to global engagement.